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Abstract: 
 
Credit rating changes for long-term foreign currency debt may act as a wake-up call with up-
grades and downgrades in one country affecting other financial markets within and across 
national borders. Such a potential (contagious) rating effect is likely to be stronger in emerg-
ing market economies, where institutional investors’ problems of asymmetric information are 
more present. This empirical study complements earlier research by explicitly examining 
cross-security and cross-country contagious rating effects of credit rating agencies’ sovereign 
risk assessments. In particular, the specific impact of sovereign rating changes during the fi-
nancial turmoil in emerging markets in the latter half of the 1990s has been examined. The 
results indicate that sovereign rating changes in a ground-zero country have a (statistically) 
significant impact on the financial markets of other emerging market economies although the 
spillover effects tend to be regional. 
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I Introduction 
 
“Ninety percent of Mexicans have never heard of the Duma, and yet 
the exchange rate and interest rates that they live with every day were 
being driven by people with names like Kiriyenko and Chernomyrdin 
and Primakov.”
1 
 
A remarkable aspect of the financial market turbulences in the second half of the 1990s was 
the transmission of difficulties from one emerging market economy to others in the same 
region and, in some cases, even beyond. For instance, a prominent characteristic of the Asian 
crisis of 1997-98 was the degree to which it spread from Thailand to other countries in the 
region in only a few months. But the impact of the Thai financial crisis was not limited to the 
Southeast Asian economies. Financial markets in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, 
Russia and South Africa came under heavy pressure as a number of countries experienced 
large capital outflows in late 1997. 
The international spillovers from the Russian crisis in August 1998 were even greater. 
Yield spreads for emerging markets’ government bonds increased sharply, pressures on the 
currency intensified in many emerging market economies, and equity prices fell substantially 
in both emerging and mature markets. The INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2000) notes 
that the widespread flight to quality and the rush for liquidity led to a severe tightening of 
credit conditions not only for emerging market borrowers but also for non-prime borrowers in 
some mature markets. In spite of probable spillover effects resulting from common shocks, 
trade linkages or common creditors, a financial crisis can spread from one country to another 
because of information asymmetries in international financial markets. Indeed, as JEANNE 
AND MASSON (2000) emphasize, for some episodes such as the financial market pressure on 
Brazil following the sovereign default of Russia in mid-August 1998 it seems problematic to 
argue that trade linkages were the only, or even an important, transmission channel of 
financial market turbulences. 
CALVO AND MENDOZA (2000b) have demonstrated that in today’s globalized financial 
markets, utility maximizing investors with worldwide diversified portfolios will follow 
financial market conventions since carrying out comprehensive country-specific analyses and 
evaluations is too costly. In consequence, institutional investors may consider several 
                                                 
1   This quotation is taken from a statement by Mexico’s Secretary of the Treasury GURRÍA (1999).  
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emerging market economies in a specific region as substantially homogenous. A new piece of 
information concerning one of these emerging market economies may then be extrapolated 
and applied to the whole group of countries. 
Country-specific events such as a negative sovereign credit rating announcement may 
be perceived as a “wake-up call” leading to a general reevaluation of investment conditions 
and prospects in the whole region, thereby inducing institutional investors to rebalance their 
portfolios. For instance, when a sovereign is lowered to speculative-grade, institutional in-
vestors who have positions in that country will usually choose to moderate their now 
increased risk exposure and will typically sell these financial instruments whose returns are 
highly volatile and positively correlated with those of the assets in the crisis-ridden country.
2 
This aspect is imperative in emerging markets where investor confidence is not particularly 
strong. Moreover, investor’s behavior is more volatile, given that some institutional investors 
are constrained to hold securities that have been classified as investment-grade by the credit 
rating agencies as a result of either official regulations or banks’ internal risk management 
practices. Moreover, if a downgrading for one country provokes worries of a financial crisis 
somewhere else, institutional investors may expect to benefit from speculating against 
currencies that they think other market participants will shorten as well. 
Previous research, for example REISEN AND VON MALTZAN (1999), MONFORD AND 
MULDER  (2000) and KRÄUSSL (2003b), has not investigated whether sovereign rating 
adjustments for one country generate contagious fluctuations in financial markets in 
neighboring countries. Therefore, the following empirical analysis concentrates on this 
potential transmission channel of financial contagion by examining whether the occurrence of 
a sovereign credit rating downgrade in a particular emerging market economy at a given point 
in time is associated with the incidence of a financial market crisis in another country at the 
same point in time. In contrast to the recent analysis by KAMINSKY AND SCHMUKLER (2002), 
this empirical study examines not only implemented sovereign credit rating changes, but also 
imminent rating actions by the agencies, such as credit watches and rating outlooks.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II explores the role of credit 
rating agencies in international financial markets. Section III gives an overview of the concept 
of financial contagion in emerging markets and discusses the underlying hypotheses of the 
                                                 
2  This happens because uniformed investors do not know whether the changes of demand within a financial 
market following a shock are due to the hedging of macroeconomic risk across financial markets or due to 
informed investors trading on private information within the financial market (see CALVO AND MENDOZA 
(2000b)).  
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empirical study while Section IV presents the methodology and database. In particular, two 
different methodologies have been applied for studying potential contagious effects of 
sovereign credit rating changes in one country on other countries. First, event studies are 
employed to get an idea of any possible dynamic effects after the agencies’ sovereign credit 
rating actions, and then panel regressions are estimated to get a sense of probable 
contemporaneous effects following the changes in the sovereign credit ratings. Section V 
presents the empirical results. Section VI concludes and offers an outlook. 
 
II  The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in International Financial Markets 
Credit rating agencies provide standardized evaluations of the likely risks and returns 
associated with alternative investments according to standardized creditworthiness categories. 
They assign credit ratings for the purpose of generating information about default 
probabilities that are pertinent for pricing and hedging risky fixed-income securities of 
corporate, municipal and sovereign issuers. Credit rating agencies supply market participants 
with a system of relative creditworthiness of all bond issues by incorporating all the 
components of default risk into a single code: the credit rating. However, the choice 
concerning the investments to be undertaken remains with the investor. The cost of producing 
such information is imposed through fees on the issuers of rated securities and is not related to 
sales of particular financial products. 
The agencies interpret their sovereign credit ratings as forward-looking indications of 
the relative risk that a sovereign debt issuer will not have the ability and willingness to make 
full and timely payments of principal and interest over the life of a particular rated financial 
instrument. Sovereign credit risk analysis may be divided into two broad components, 
specifically economic and political risk. Economic risk deals with the government’s ability to 
repay its obligations on time and is a function of both qualitative and quantitative factors, 
while political risk addresses the sovereign’s willingness to repay its outstanding debt on 
time.  
For assigning their sovereign credit ratings the agencies apply an ordinal scale. 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) ratings for long-term foreign currency bonds run from AAA, the 
highest, through AA, A, and BBB, and then all the way down to CC. Similarly, the sovereign 
credit ratings assigned by Moody’s Investors Service’ (Moody’s) range from that the 
sovereign is fairly unlikely to default (Aaa) down to that it has a relatively high risk of  
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default (C). Sovereign credit ratings are also subject to refinements. S&P’s sovereign credit 
ratings from double-A to triple-C may be modified by the addition of a plus or a minus to 
show their relative standing within the major rating categories. Moody’s applies for this 
reason numerical modifiers 1, 2 and 3 in each rating category from double-A to Caa. 
In recent years, both S&P and Moody’s have supplemented their credit risk as-
sessments with credit watches and rating outlooks, respectively, designed to indicate the 
credit rating agencies’ perspectives on developments that might induce a rating change. 
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (2001) mentions that it is crucial to discriminate between a 
credit watch and a rating outlook. Both are intended to communicate the agencies’ credit 
opinion to the market participants, but each contains different information and has separate 
rating implications. Credit watches are part of the formal committee-based rating process by 
which the agencies’ credit ratings are assigned, monitored and changed over time. In contrast, 
as the agencies emphasize, a change in the rating outlook is neither a rating change nor a 
review for a potential credit rating change. Therefore, a rating outlook may be considered as a 
useful early indicator, but as a weaker signal than a credit watch. 
Credit ratings are often separated into two broad categories, i.e., investment-grade and 
speculative- or non-investment-grade. MERRILL  LYNCH (1999) mentions that investment-
grade issues are typically considered to be appropriate investments for institutional investors. 
S&P’s issues rated BBB−  and above are investment-grade, while Moody’s split is made at 
Baa3. This differentiation has an essential role for institutional investors since the majority of 
them operate within restrictive limitations on the risk of financial instruments in their 
portfolio. In some cases these are absolute constraints: a manager of an investment-grade 
bond portfolio may be precluded from trading bonds that are not classified as investment-
grade.  
As a consequence, a sovereign credit rating upgrade to investment-grade is vital since it 
opens up a much wider investor base by making the bonds appropriate for enclosure in 
benchmark investment-grade indexes. This implicates that the sovereign credit rating upgrade 
will result in both increased and more stable demand for bonds of that particular emerging 
market. On the other hand, when an issuer receives a credit rating below-investment-grade, 
the number of potential investors radically declines. However, such a credit rating-effect is to 
some extent incorporated into the pricing of the country’s debt concurrently with the news 
that the sovereign credit rating will be placed on review for a possible upgrade. This reflects 
the demand both from investment-grade portfolio managers that have some flexibility to make  
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allocations to non-investment-grade assets, and from unconstrained investors, for example 
high-yield portfolio managers and hedge funds. These institutional investors are able to 
purchase opportunistically and realize much of the prize impact of the credit rating upgrade 
and subsequently sell after the actual upgrade to other investors who have not had the 
flexibility to buy prior to the actual inclusion in investment-grade indexes.  
Furthermore, through the so-called “sovereign ceiling”, however, the sovereign credit 
rating has a major influence on the credit risk assignments for all other domestic entities. 
STANDARD  & POOR’S (1997) and MOODY’S  INVESTORS  SERVICE  (1999) record that until 
recently, the sovereign credit rating set a ceiling on the credit risk assessment that could be 
achieved by other domestic entities, under the assumption that the sovereign has the first 
claim on available foreign exchange reserves and controls the ability of any resident entity to 
get hold of international funds to compensate lenders.
3 
 
III Theory  and  Hypotheses 
In order to formalize a definition of “financial contagion” it is necessary to distinguish four 
transmission mechanisms through which financial market crises might be propagated across 
countries. Firstly, several countries can be similarly affected by a common shock, such as an 
abrupt change in world interest rates. Secondly, trade linkages can spread a financial crisis, as 
a currency devaluation in one country weakens macroeconomic fundamentals in other 
countries by diminishing the competitiveness of their exports. Thirdly, financial market 
interdependence can also contribute to the transmission of a financial crisis, as preliminary 
instabilities in one country can lead international investors to withdraw their loans elsewhere, 
thereby generating a “credit crunch” in other emerging market economies. Finally, a financial 
crisis in one country can worsen market participants’ perception of the economic conditions 
and prospects in other countries with similar characteristics, as a consequence setting off a 
widespread fall in international investors’ sentiment. This empirical study will concentrate its 
analysis on this latter transmission mechanism of financial contagion in emerging market 
crises. 
                                                 
3   For instance, when Moody’s downgraded Japan’s long-term foreign currency rating on November 18, 1998, 
from Aaa to Aa1, all other triple-A rated Japanese issuers were also downgraded by one rating-notch. This 
credit rating boundary of the sovereign ceiling can generate a fundamental problem for companies located in 
countries that have political or financial instabilities, but which would otherwise have high corporate credit 
ratings.  
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III.1  Shifts in Investor Sentiment 
Following GOLDSTEIN (1998) a financial crisis in one country can operate as a “wake-up call” 
to institutional investors for reassessing other countries’ economic conditions, even if the 
macroeconomic fundamentals have not objectively changed.
4 CALVO AND REINHART (2000) 
reasons that emerging market economies which are financially vulnerable may then be subject 
to contagion effects from a shift in market sentiment or an increased risk aversion, causing 
institutional investors to moderate the credit risk of their portfolios and “flee to quality”. 
The most promising targets are currencies that seem likely to be defended by central 
bank interventions in the exchange market and/or increases in domestic interest rates, but 
which look most probable to eventually collapse and generate speculative gains. CALVO AND 
REINHART (2000) argue that the probability of a financial market crisis triggered by a sudden 
change in market participants’ sentiment is expected to be greater, the larger the country’s 
share of short-term liabilities is and the larger the maturity mismatch between financial assets 
and outstanding debt, because the country will then be more exposed to a withdrawal by only 
a modest share of international investors. Emerging market economies with a weak banking 
system are particularly in danger because financial market participants may value this as an 
important limitation on the central bank’s ability and willingness to raise interest rates in 
defense of a speculative currency attack (see CALVO (1997)). 
According to CHANG AND VELASCO (2000), one common feature of all financial crises 
in emerging market economies during the latter half of the 1990s was international illiquidity. 
For instance, the crisis-ridden Southeast Asian countries had high and sharply increasing 
ratios of short-term liabilities to liquid assets. These emerging market economies were 
therefore extremely vulnerable to what CALVO AND REINHART (2000) term the “sudden stop 
syndrome”, denoting an enormous reversal of capital inflows, which ultimately happened in 
Southeast Asian financial markets in the second half of 1997. CHANG AND VELASCO (2000) 
emphasize that the financial panic in emerging market economies strengthened by itself, 
causing institutional investors to recall loans and other market participants to withdraw funds 
from commercial banks. This behavior exaggerated the illiquidity of domestic financial 
institutions and generated just another cycle of costly asset liquidation and asset price 
deflation. 
                                                 
4   GOLDSTEIN (1998) argues that Thailand acted as a “wake-up call” for international investors to reassess the 
creditworthiness of other Asian borrowers. When the market participants recognized that the other Southeast 
Asian emerging market economies had financial market weaknesses similar to those in Thailand, the 
institutional investors shortened their positions in these countries and ultimately the Asian crisis spread.  
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RADELET AND SACHS (2000) reason that the Asian crisis of 1997-98 was caused by a 
sudden shift in market participants’ sentiment. Emerging market economies that relied on 
short-term capital inflows were trapped in a liquidity crisis when institutional investors 
declined to roll their claims forward. In Thailand and South Korea, domestic commercial 
banks could not obtain sufficient US dollars to pay off short-term liabilities when lenders 
refused to roll forward the countries’ outstanding obligations. Nevertheless, ITO (2000) 
emphasizes that the Southeast Asian commercial banks were not insolvent rather that it was 
the market participants’ anxiety of a probable bank run. The INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND (2001c) points out that when the Hong Kong SAR dollar came under severe financial 
market pressure in late October 1997, despite its solid macroeconomic fundamentals, investor 
sentiment concerning Asian financial markets shifted abruptly, and Southeast Asian 
economies that had been receiving huge capital inflows suddenly found it impossible to 
obtain new international financing and even experienced large capital outflows. 
 
III.2 Hypotheses 
There are two alternative views about the informational value of the agencies’ credit ratings. 
One view is that credit rating agencies only have access to publicly available information and 
that the agencies generally lag the financial markets in processing that information. 
Proponents of this viewpoint reason that the frequency with which credit rating agencies 
review corporate and sovereign issuers is too low even to generate appropriate summaries of 
relevant public information (see GROPP AND RICHARDS (2001)). According to this 
argumentation, credit rating changes should not affect market prices, if financial markets are 
efficient in semi-strong form. 
An alternative view is that credit rating agencies are specialists at obtaining and 
processing information, and thereby generate information on issuers’ default risk that was not 
previously in the financial markets. A negative credit rating announcement might induce 
institutional investors to rebalance their portfolios for risk management, liquidity and/or other 
reasons. Sovereign credit rating changes may also reveal new information about a country and 
thus may encourage financial market rallies or downturns. This rating effect is likely to be 
stronger in emerging markets, where problems of asymmetric information and transparency 
are more severe. 
Proponents of the asymmetric information framework emphasize that in financial 
markets information acquisition and processing is subject to free-rider problems, which can  
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be aggravated in the wake of a (rating) shock event. CALVO AND MENDOZA (2000b), for 
example, argue that because of the high costs of generating information, most market 
participants prefer to follow a handful of supposedly informed investors and financial 
analysts. As a result, the financial market will be subject to rumors and will exhibit herding 
behavior, since less informed investors choose mistakenly but rationally to “follow the herd” 
if they are evaluated based on their relative performance vis-à-vis other portfolio managers. 
These growing informational asymmetries might lead in the aftermath of a (rating) shock 
event to a homogeneously negative perception of overall credit quality so that creditors ulti-
mately will withdraw their funds. 
 
IV Methodology  and  Data 
For assessing the characteristics of the emerging market countries that have been affected 
during the financial crises in the latter half of the 1990s, an operational definition of 
speculative market pressure is required. In contrast to previous empirical studies, for example 
REISEN AND VON MALTZAN (1999) and KAMINSKY AND SCHMUKLER (2002), which try to 
analyze the influence of credit rating agencies on emerging market crises by looking solely at 
the effects of sovereign credit rating actions on government bond yield spreads, this index of 
speculative market pressure should not contain government bond yield spreads for several 
central reasons. 
Firstly, many of the emerging market economies do not have well-developed domestic 
financial markets implying that the construction of a reliable and comparable data set on 
government bond yield spreads is a problematical task, given the low liquidity of the 
sovereign bonds. Secondly, there is the general issue that government bonds are typically less 
liquid than stocks, and that the reported prices are often indicative quotes rather than actual 
trades. It can be very difficult to get accurate up-to-date pricing of all but a few benchmark 
issues. Previous empirical studies make also the factual error that they consider for their 
whole investigation and estimation period only a single sovereign bond, despite the fact that 
the maturity structure of these government bonds changes over time. Finally, especially 
during financial crisis episodes many of these emerging market governments’ bonds are not 
traded on a regular basis and therefore not accurately priced. 
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IV.1  Index of Speculative Market Pressure 
As the financial crises in the latter half of the 1990s have shown, when an emerging market 
economy suffers a deep financial crisis all domestic financial markets are affected at the same 
time: the currency weakens, domestic interest rates increase and stock market indexes slide. 
Therefore, in following the approach by KRÄUSSL (2003b), an index of speculative market 
pressure is specified as a weighted average of daily nominal exchange rate changes, daily 
short-term interest rate changes and daily stock market changes. The resulting index of a 
country’s i daily speculative market pressure at time t is given through 
  123 it it it it SMP a e a r a s ≡++  (1) 
where  it e  denotes the first differences of the nominal exchange rate, that is the price of 
one US dollar in country i’s currency at time t, rit denotes the first differences of the domestic 
short-term interest rate, sit denotes the first differences of the domestic main stock market 
index, and a1, a2 and a3 are the weights assigned to these three factors, respectively. To 
prevent any of these three factors dominating the index of speculative market pressure, the 
volatilities of the three components are equalized, by assigning the variance weighted weights 
we, wr and ws to them.
5 
A higher speculative market pressure index SMP indicates greater pressure on the 
financial markets in country i at day t since it will be mirrored in higher values of the three 
components. Insofar as sovereign credit ratings convey new information to market 
participants, the expected rating effect on the index of speculative market pressure is 
straightforward: in case of a downgrade the index should rise, while in the occurrence of a 
positive rating action the SMP should fall. 
 
IV.2  Event Study Approach 
In order to study the dynamic effects of sovereign credit rating actions in country j on 
financial markets in the other countries ij ≠ , event studies commonly used in the finance 
literature are employed. Standard event study methodology requires linking sovereign credit 
rating events to abnormal movements in the index, which is given as the difference between 
model-generated and actual market movements. The model-generated movement  it SMP  
                                                 
5   See KRÄUSSL (2003b) for a detailed discussion of the motivation and specification of this daily index of 
speculative market pressure.  
- 10 - 
which depends on the actual movements of the speculative market pressure index 
m
it SMP  is 
given by 
 
m
it i i it it SMP SMP α β ε =+ +  (2) 
with E[ ] 0 it ε =  and Var
2 ] [
i it ε σ ε = . However, the coefficients for model-generated 
movements have to be calculated for periods free of sovereign credit rating events. But since 
the relevant time series of sovereign credit ratings are much too short to calculate the 
coefficients within an event-free period, CAMPBELL, LO AND MACKINLAY (1997) proposes 
that  i α  have to be constrained to zero and  i β  to one. 
As a consequence, the abnormal movements of the speculative market pressure index 
a
it SMP  are given in analogy to market-adjusted yield spreads as the difference between the 
model-generated movements and the actual variations: 
 
m
it it
a
it SMP SMP SMP − = ∆
________
. (3) 
This implies that the event study is based on the observed “foreign exchange spreads” 
between the domestic nominal exchange rates and the US dollar. In the case of short-term 
interest rates, the yield spreads between the domestic and the benchmark US short-term 
interest rates are exercised, while in the case of stock market indexes the “stock spreads” 
between domestic stock market indexes and the US S&P500 stock market index are utilized. 
To perform event studies, “clean events” are necessary, that means that sovereign credit 
rating actions do not overlap. This distinction is important when considering an event 
window, in order to be able to isolate the effect of each sovereign credit rating. In the 
following, the sovereign rating effects will be examined ten days before and ten days after the 
event. As Figure 1 illustrates, the event is defined as day-zero, the period between the days 0 
to +1 is defined as the event window, the period from the days − 10 to − 1 as the pre-
announcement window, and the period from the days +2 to +11 as the post-announcement 
window.  
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Day _10 Day 0 Day +1 Day +11
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Post-Announcement
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Figure 1:  The Event Window 
The event window is defined somewhat wider than just one day, because there is no 
exact information available on the announcement time of the sovereign credit rating action by 
the agencies and hence it is not possible to determine whether the announcement was done 
during trading or after trading on a given day. The index of speculative market pressure is set 
to 100 at day − 10, once appropriate sovereign credit rating events are identified, in a way that 
it is more comfortable to measure the cumulative sovereign credit rating effects over time and 
at the same time, to compare different variations of the SMP across the emerging market 
economies. 
 
IV.3  Panel Regression Analysis 
By using panel regression analysis, the contemporaneous reaction of the speculative market 
pressure index in emerging market country i to changes in the sovereign credit rating of 
emerging market country j can be measured. In addition, the empirical analysis also 
investigates the potential impact of changes in the US short-term interest rate on financial 
markets in emerging market economies as suggested, for example, by EICHENGREEN AND 
MODY (1998) and CALVO AND MENDOZA (2000a). The fact that this empirical study uses 
daily data does not allow control for macroeconomic fundamentals, which are reported on a 
lower frequency. After controlling for past changes of the speculative market pressure index, 
the specification results suggest to integrating an AR(1) process in the model. 
Following the modeling approach by KAMINSKY AND SCHMUKLER (2002), to examine 
whether there is a potential contagious rating effect of sovereign risk adjustments by the credit 
rating agencies, the resulting specification I is given by the pooled panel: 
  1
ij U S
it it it jt t it SMP SMP R R r α βγ γ δε − ∆= + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + . (4) 
The sub-indexes i,  j and t stand for domestic country, foreign country and time, 
respectively. The error term  it ε  is characterized by an independently distributed random  
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variable with mean zero and variance 
2
it σ . Equation (4) is estimated using OLS, allowing for 
heteroscedastical residuals. 
The variable 
i
it R ∆  stands for a sovereign credit rating action in country i at time t and is 
equal to 1 if there is a positive sovereign credit rating announcement by the agencies, equal to 
− 1 when there is a negative sovereign credit rating announcement and equal to zero otherwise. 
If changes in sovereign credit ratings convey new information to market participants it is 
expected that  ˆ 0
i γ < , indicating that domestic sovereign credit rating downgrades lead to 
increases in the index of financial market pressure.
6 
The variable 
j
it R ∆  is similar to the latter but takes the value 1 when there is a positive 
sovereign credit rating announcement by either S&P or Moody’s, the value − 1 when there is a 
negative sovereign credit rating announcement, and is zero otherwise, in the foreign country j 
for  j i ≠ . If adjustments in foreign sovereign credit ratings transmit new facts to financial 
markets, it is expected that  ˆ 0
j γ < , which means that foreign sovereign credit rating 
downgrades in emerging market economies have a (negative) contagious rating effect on the 
domestic index of financial market pressure. Both changes in implemented sovereign credit 
ratings and imminent sovereign credit rating actions are examined in the same variable to 
avoid studying the potential rating effects of only a small number of credit rating agencies’ 
announcements. 
The variable 
US
t r ∆  represents the change in US short-term interest rates, i.e., the interest 
rate given through 100 times log(1 )
US
t r + . There are at least two probable transmission 
channels through which variations in US interest rates might have an effect on emerging 
markets’ sovereign risk. Firstly, GERTLER AND ROGOFF (1990) emphasize that a rise in US 
interest rates increases the burden of the emerging markets’ outstanding debt, thereby 
decreasing the countries’ repayment capability. Secondly, EICHENGREEN AND MODY (1998) 
mention that increases in US interest rates can lessen institutional investors’ “appetite for 
risk”, thereby reducing the demand for risky high-yield assets from emerging market 
economies and, as a result, increasing the sovereign risk of these countries. For these reasons 
it is expected that  0 ˆ > δ , since increases in US short-term interest rates may lead to a higher 
index of speculative market pressure. 
                                                 
6 This expectation is in line with the empirical results by KRÄUSSL (2003b).  
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The financial crises in emerging market economies in the latter half of the 1990s and 
the speed at which financial turbulences in one country overwhelmed the country’s region and 
even spread around the globe have produced an ever expanding literature on contagion in 
international financial markets. While opinions about the importance of different channels of 
transmission differ, many empirical studies conclude that financial contagion has been 
typically regional. KAMINSKY AND SCHMUKLER (2002) mention that it might be interesting to 
analyze whether these regional effects are also present when the potential contagious rating 
effects of sovereign credit ratings actions are examined. Therefore, the next specification II 
will be estimated through the pooled panel regression: 
  1
irn r U S
it it it rt nrt t it SMP SMP R R R r α βγ γ γ δε − ∆= + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + . (5) 
The variable 
r
it R ∆  takes the value 1 if there is a positive announcement on the sovereign 
credit rating, the value − 1 if there is a negative sovereign credit rating action and the value 
zero otherwise, at time t by the credit rating agencies from country r for ri ≠ . The index r 
represents an emerging market economy that belongs to the same geographic region as 
country i, given by either Asian, Latin American, Eastern European or African and Middle 
East economies. If changes in foreign but regional sovereign credit ratings convey new 
information to market participants, it is expected that  ˆ 0
r γ < , indicating that foreign sovereign 
credit rating downgrades of emerging market economies in the same region have a (negative) 
contagious rating effect on the domestic index of speculative market pressure in country i. 
The variable 
nr
it R ∆  is similar to the latter but is equal to 1 for positive sovereign credit 
rating actions for emerging market economies outside the geographic region, equal to − 1 for 
negative sovereign credit rating adjustments and equal to zero otherwise. It is expected that 
ˆˆ0
rn r γγ << , intending that a foreign sovereign credit rating downgrade outside the region 
have also a (negative) contagious rating effect on the domestic index of financial market 
pressure, but to a lesser extent than a credit rating announcement for a sovereign inside the 
region. 
Another interesting issue is to examine the impact of substantial changes in in-
ternational financial market conditions on emerging market economies. This topic has 
generated many academic articles following CALVO  (1997), who emphasized the close 
connection of capital inflows to emerging market economies to US monetary policy during 
the early 1990s. Numerous empirical studies have focused on the relationship between net 
capital flows or foreign exchange reserves and interest rates in financial centers. Some  
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academics have paid attention to the linkages between returns in emerging market economies 
and returns in financial centers, while others concentrated on the effects of interest rate 
increases in financial centers on the interest rates and government bond yield spreads of 
emerging market economies. 
As a consequence, specification III examines whether changes of the US short-term 
interest rate might have a stronger effect on vulnerable emerging market countries. For that 
reason, the sample is divided into two sub-samples according to the sovereign credit ratings 
assigned by S&P and Moody’s. In particular, the observations are divided into two equal 
parts: sub-sample I consists of emerging market economies with investment-grade sovereign 
credit ratings and sub-sample II contains the governments with speculative-grade sovereign 
credit ratings. The resulting specification III is then given by the pooled panel 
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Specification III is similar to equation (5), but it allows for examining explicitly the 
impact of a potential vulnerability effect by specifying two dummy variables hit and lit. 
Therefore, two different coefficients for the sensitivity to changes in US short-term interest 
rates will be estimated, notably 
h δ  for investment-grade sovereigns and 
l δ  for sovereigns 
that are rated below investment-grade by the credit rating agencies. 
KAMINSKY AND SCHMUKLER (2002) indicate that it is expected for at least three reasons 
that emerging market countries with superior sovereign credit ratings should be less troubled 
by movements in US short-term interest rates due to the transmission channels of financial 
contagion. Firstly, given that superior sovereign credit ratings indicate a lower probability of 
the sovereign’s default, changes in US short-term interest rates should have a greater impact 
on financial markets of countries with lower sovereign credit ratings. Secondly, governments 
with investment-grade sovereign credit ratings tend to have a lower level of external debt 
implying that the burden of outstanding (short-term) liabilities will become less intense in 
countries with higher sovereign credit ratings when US short-term interest rates increase. Fi-
nally, if there is a market participants’ “flight to quality” when the US short-term interest rates 
increase, the financial markets of riskier emerging market economies, i.e., lower-rated by the 
credit rating agencies, should respond more sharply. Since it is expected that increases in US  
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short-term interest rates lead to a higher index of speculative market pressure, the coefficient 
of the riskier emerging market economies should be higher than the coefficient of the 
investment-grade sovereigns:  ˆˆ0
lh δδ << . 
 
IV.4 Data 
The data set consists of daily sovereign credit ratings of long-term foreign currency debt 
which have been assigned by the two major credit rating agencies, S&P and Moody’s. The 
observed period between January 1, 1997, and December 31, 2000 fully captures the financial 
market turmoil in the latter half of the 1990s, i.e., the financial market crises in Southeast 
Asia, Russia and Brazil. In the case of S&P, the sovereign credit rating history was obtained 
directly from its historical database on the Internet. However, in the case of Moody’s, the 
press releases about its sovereign credit rating actions had to be collated and checked over the 
full four years to construct its sovereign credit rating history. 
In total, a sample of 302 sovereign credit rating announcements assigned by the two 
agencies for the 28 countries in the sample during the period between January 1, 1997 and 
December 31, 2000 has been gathered. 69 of the credit rating agencies’ announcements report 
actual sovereign credit rating downgrades and 43 actual upgrades, 42 sovereign credit ratings 
were assigned a negative rating outlook and 28 a positive rating outlook, 30 times sovereigns 
were put on negative credit watch and 14 times on positive credit watch, while the remainder 
contained sovereign credit rating confirmations or first assignments. A detailed illustration of 
the sovereign credit rating actions for all 28 emerging market countries employed in the 
empirical analysis during this period is presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
Although the credit rating agencies use different symbols in assessing sovereign credit 
risk, every S&P’s symbol has its counterpart in Moody’s sovereign credit rating scale. This 
correspondence allows comparison of the sovereign credit ratings assigned by the two 
agencies. Moreover, it permits a linear transformation of the agencies’ ordinal sovereign 
credit rating scales into numbers (see Table A2 in the Appendix). This linear transformation 
implies that a higher sovereign credit rating denotes a lower probability of (selective) default. 
As discussed above, the effect of a sovereign credit rating change is often partially 
incorporated into the institutional investor’s credit risk judgments when the country is placed 
on review for a possible upgrade or a possible downgrade. In order to consider not only the 
implemented long-term foreign currency debt rating changes but also the credit rating  
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agencies’ imminent rating actions, the numerical scale of the transformed sovereign credit 
ratings also contains positive and negative rating outlooks and credit watches. 
The obtained sovereign credit rating history indicates that countries with a positive 
(negative) credit watch have never been downgraded (upgraded) at the next sovereign credit 
rating change. Moreover, about 60 percent of all credit watches in the sample have resulted in 
a sovereign credit rating change in the expected direction. As a result, the consideration of 
imminent sovereign credit rating actions is realized by adding 0.3 of one rating-notch for a 
positive credit watch by S&P and Moody’s and by adding − 0.3 of one rating-notch for a 
negative credit watch to the implemented sovereign credit rating. A positive rating outlook by 
S&P and Moody’s is considered by adding 0.15 of one rating-notch, while a negative rating 
outlook by S&P and Moody’s is taken into account by adding − 0.15 to the implemented 
sovereign credit rating. 
The other three types of data needed to build the speculative market pressure index are 
the daily nominal exchange rates, short-term interest rates and stock market price indexes. In 
the case of short-term interest rates overnight interbank interest rates are employed since the 
overnight interest (call) rate, i.e., the interest rate on the interbank market, is the typically 
watched indicator of liquidity conditions in the money market (see, for example, 
BORENSZTEIN AND LEE (2002)). In the case of stock markets the major national stock indexes 
are used, which are measured for each country in US dollars to enable comparison of stock 
market returns across countries in the same unit of account. All these three types of data were 
obtained from Bloomberg L.P., with holidays and weekends excluded. In case of missing 
values, the data were obtained from Datastream and from the websites of the emerging market 
economies’ respective central banks. 
Table 1 illustrates that the sample used in this study consists of 28 emerging and transi-
tion economy countries, while the inclusion criterion is that the sovereigns have to be rated 
both by S&P and Moody’s throughout the period between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 
2000. However, in the cases of Ecuador, Peru and Egypt, a country is employed in the 
empirical analysis when the sovereign is first rated by either S&P or Moody’s. When the 
other credit rating agency also starts assessing this country, the averages of the adjustments of 
the sovereign credit ratings by both agencies are employed. in the Appendix indicates that 
when the credit rating agencies disagreed in their overall risk level assigned to an emerging 
market country, their sovereign credit ratings in most cases differed by only one rating-notch.  
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Table 1  Emerging Market Countries Employed in the Empirical Study 
IMF  Country  S&P  Moody’s  Stock Market Index 
186  Turkey  X  X  ISE Nat 100 
199  South Africa  X  X  JSE All Share 
213 Argentina  X  X  General 
223 Brazil  X  X  Bovespa 
228 Chile  X  X  IPSA 
233 Colombia  X  X  IBB  General 
248 Ecuador  07/29/00 07/24/97  ECGUB 
273 Mexico  X  X  IPC 
293 Peru  12/18/97 X  Lima  General 
299 Venezuela  X  X  IBC 
469 Egypt  01/15/97 X  CMA 
532  Hong Kong SAR  X  X  Hang Seng 
534  India  X  X  BSE Sensex 30 
536 Indonesia  X  X  Jakarta  Composite 
542  South Korea  X  X  Seoul Composite 
548 Malaysia  X  X  KLSE  Composite 
564 Pakistan  X  X  Karachi  100 
566  The Philippines  X  X  PSE Composite 
576 Singapore  X  X  Straits  Times 
578 Thailand  X  X  Bangkok  SET 
686  Morocco  03/02/98  03/02/98  CASA CSG 25 
922 Russia  X  X  Moscow  Times 
924 China  X  X  Shanghai  A 
935  Czech Rep.  X  X  PX 50 
936 Slovak  Rep.  X  X  SAX 
944 Hungary  X  X  Bux 
964 Poland  X  X  Wig 
9998 Taiwan  X  X  Taiwan  Weighted 
 
Table 1 shows that the sample contains 11 Asian economies (China, Hong Kong SAR, 
India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Thailand), eight Latin American economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,  
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Mexico, Peru and Venezuela), five Eastern European (Transition) economies (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and the Slovak Republic), three African/Middle East 
economies (Egypt, Morocco and South Africa) and Turkey. Therefore, the empirical study 
analyzes exactly those countries which are classified by The Economist and the Financial 
Times as emerging market economies as of January 1997, with the exception of Israel. 
Table 2 provides some useful measures of financial market stability in the sample. 
Table 2:  Sample Statistics 
Log Change in Variable  Mean  Median Min  Max  SD 
Nominal  Exchange  Rate  0.0184 0.0155 0.0000 0.4241 0.0213 
Stock  Market  Index  0.0142 0.0098 0.0000 0.3865 0.0167 
Overnight  Interest  Rate  0.0219 0.0164 0.0000 0.4773 0.0258 
SMP  Index  0.0177 0.0143 0.0000 0.0435 0.0201 
 
It shows that daily variations in absolute values are large in all three separate financial 
markets and oscillate around 1.8 percent for nominal exchange rates, around 1.4 percent for 
stock market indexes and around 2.2 percent for overnight interest rates, thereby resulting in a 
daily average movement in absolute value of about 1.8 percent for the index of speculative 
market pressure. 
 
V Empirical  Results 
V.1  Short-Term Contagious Impact of Sovereign Credit Rating Actions 
Table 3 presents the results of the event study of sovereign credit rating actions in country j 
on the financial markets of the countries i with ij ≠ , for the ten trading days before and after 
the sovereign credit rating announcement as well as for the two-day event window, i.e., day-
zero and day +1, for the date of the adjustment by the credit rating agencies. Table 3 reports 
the change of the cumulative mean of the speculative market pressure index separately for 
positive and negative sovereign credit rating announcements by S&P and Moody’s, with the 
respective t-statistics and significance levels.  
- 19 - 
Table 3:   Short-Term Contagious Impact of Sovereign Credit Rating Actions 
Period Positive  Negative 
− 10 to − 11  − 0.006 
(− 0.938) 
0.011
* 
(1.684) 
0 to +11  − 0.009
* 
(− 1.834) 
0.016
** 
(2.291) 
+2 to +11  − 0.009 
(− 0.815) 
0.025
*** 
(3.487) 
 
The empirical results of the event study in Table 3 demonstrates a significant response 
to sovereign credit rating events with the expected sign in both sub-panels: a sovereign credit 
rating change in country j has a contagious impact on the financial markets in country i, while 
a positive (negative) sovereign credit rating announcement is associated with a sliding (rising) 
index of speculative market pressure. 
While the event study results are statistically highly significant for negative sovereign 
credit rating announcements, they are in the case of positive sovereign credit rating actions 
only significant throughout the event window and then only at the ten percent level. 
Nonetheless, these empirical results suggest the existence of important spillover effects of 
changes in foreign sovereign credit ratings on the domestic index of speculative market 
pressure. 
Figure 2 illustrates these event study results by presenting the cumulative abnormal 
movements of the speculative market pressure index in emerging market economy i around 
the time of positive and negative sovereign credit rating announcements in the countries j, 
which are the other 27 emerging market economies in the sample. The index of speculative 
market pressure is normalized to 100 at day − 10, day-zero is the day of the sovereign credit 
rating action, and the gray color illustrates the event window constituted by day-zero and 
day +1.  
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Figure 2:   Short-Term Contagious Impact of Sovereign Rating Actions 
Overall, Table 3 and Figure 2 indicate that the combination of the contagious rating 
effects during the event window and during the post-announcement period results in a 
considerable contagious rating impact of over 4 percent of a negative sovereign credit rating 
announcement in country i on the index of speculative market pressure of country j. 
 
V.2  Country Studies: Short-Term Contagious Impact of Sovereign 
Rating Actions 
In the following the event study approach is further applied for the empirical analysis of 
several sharp sovereign credit rating actions in different ground-zero countries and their 
potential contagious impact on other emerging market economies. The event windows are 
chosen in a way to consider the most prominent sovereign credit rating actions on the 
respective government while trying to analyze “clean events” to be able to isolate the rating 
effects of each sovereign credit rating announcement. The other emerging market economies 
i  are chosen as those emphasized in the empirical literature on financial contagion as being 
mostly affected by spillover effects in the respective ground-zero countries during the 
financial market turbulences. 
Figure 3 shows the financial market reactions in Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and 
the Philippines, around Thailand’s sovereign credit rating downgrade by Moody’s from Baa1 
with a negative rating outlook to notwithstanding investment-grade Baa3 but still with a 
negative rating outlook on November 27, 1997, indicating that Thailand’s government debt 
was only one rating-notch away from becoming a junk bond.  
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Figure 3:   Country Study: Short-Term Contagious Impact of Thailand’s Credit  
Rating Downgrade on November 27, 1997 
The empirical results in Figure 3 suggest that Moody’s lowering of Thailand’s credit 
rating had a moderate short-term impact on the financial markets in the other Southeast Asian 
crisis economies. As expected from theoretical considerations, when the negative sovereign 
credit rating action in the ground-zero country should have a contagious rating effect on the 
other emerging market economies, the index of speculative market pressure rose in all four 
countries after Moody’s sovereign credit rating downgrade of Thailand. The strongest 
contagious impact appears to be on the Malaysian financial markets, while the rating effect on 
the other Southeast Asian emerging market economies seems to be weaker. Moreover, as 
shown in Table 2, the daily average change in the speculative market pressure index oscillates 
around 1.8 percent, indicating that the negative sovereign credit rating announcement on 
Thailand did not have a strong contagious rating effect on the other Asian crisis-ridden 
emerging market countries. 
However, during November 1997 there were many other pessimistic news reports in 
the financial markets which certainly contaminated the negative sovereign credit rating 
announcement of Thailand’s long-term foreign currency debt and potentially had a strong 
effect on the other Southeast Asian emerging market economies’ creditworthiness. For 
instance, on November 17, 1997 the South Korean central bank abandoned the defense of its 
currency. In addition, as Table A1 in the Appendix documents, South Korea’s credit rating on  
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long-term foreign currency debt was repeatedly downgraded by the credit rating agencies in 
late November 1997. 
In the days immediately following the negative sovereign credit rating action on the 
Thai long-term foreign currency debt rating, there was no contagious rating effect on the 
Argentine, Brazilian and Mexican financial markets. In fact, in the days succeeding the 
sovereign credit rating lowering of Thailand, the index of speculative market pressure slid in 
all three Latin American countries. Although, this is, admittedly, a somewhat simplistic 
analysis, the event study results might suggest that during November 1997 the financial 
market turbulences in Southeast Asia were not transmitted via sovereign credit rating changes 
to the financial markets in Latin America. 
The graphs in Figure 4 illustrate the movements of the respective speculative market 
pressure index of the Philippines, Hong Kong SAR, Russia, Brazil, Argentina and South 
Africa ten days before and after the “sovereign rating crisis” on December 22, 1997.
7 
Table A1 in the Appendix indicates that on that single day, Moody’s downgraded Indonesia 
from investment-grade Baa3 with a negative rating outlook to speculative-grade Ba1, South 
Korea from investment-grade Baa2 with a negative credit watch by two rating-notches to non-
investment-grade Ba1, Malaysia from investment-grade A1 to still investment-grade A2 and 
Thailand from investment-grade Baa3 with a negative rating outlook to speculative-grade 
Ba1, while S&P lowered South Korea’s credit rating by four rating-notches from investment-
grade BBB−  with a negative credit watch to non-investment-grade B+ while still keeping a 
negative credit watch. 
                                                 
7 See KRÄUSSL (2003) for a detailed analysis of the so-called sovereign rating crisis.  
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Figure 4:   Country Study: Short-Term Contagious Impact of the “Sovereign Rating Crisis” 
on December 22, 1997 
Figure 4 illustrates that these collective sovereign credit rating actions by S&P and 
Moody’s resulted in sharp increases in the speculative market pressure index in the other 
Southeast Asian crisis economies, but to a much lesser extent on the financial markets of 
Russia, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa. These event study results indicate that the first-
time assignments of sovereign credit ratings below investment-grade to Indonesia, South 
Korea and Thailand resulted in a sharp cutback in the willingness of market participants to 
take positions in Asian emerging market countries, but that these contagious rating effects 
were of a regional nature. 
Figure 5 demonstrates the contagious rating effect of S&P’s downgrade of Russian 
long-term foreign currency debt from B−  with a negative rating outlook by two rating-notches  
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to triple-C while still keeping a negative rating outlook on August 17, 1998 on the financial 
markets of Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Turkey. 
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Figure 5:   Country Study: Short-Term Contagious Impact of Russia’s Credit Rating 
Downgrade on August 17, 1998 
The movements of the respective speculative market pressure indexes show that the 
lowering of Russia’s credit rating might have had a strong contagious impact on the other 
financial markets, particularly in the case of Brazil, where the SMP index jumped by more 
than 20 percent after the Russian credit rating downgrade by S&P. In the case of Argentina, 
immediately after August 17, 1998 the index of speculative market pressure rose by more 
than eight percent due to the huge rise in overnight interest rates and a sharp sliding stock 
market, but as Figure 5 shows, in the case of Argentina and strongly opposed to the financial 
markets reaction in Brazil, the contagious rating effects of Russia’s credit rating downgrade 
were only short-lived.  
The combination of the collapse of the Russian ruble and the debt moratorium of 
private principal payments announced by Russia on August 17, 1998 came as an immense 
shock to international investors, because the sovereign was viewed by many financial market 
observers as “too big too fail” or according to EDWARDS (2000) even as “too nuclear to fail”. 
Therefore, the rising indexes of speculative market pressure in the aftermath of August 17, 
1998, as illustrated in Figure 5, should not be entirely attributed to S&P’s sovereign credit  
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rating change, because other negative financial market news unquestionably contaminated the 
contagious rating effects. 
The graphs in Figure 6 portray the impact of Brazil’s credit rating downgrade by one 
rating-notch from BB−  with a negative rating outlook to B+ with still a negative rating 
outlook by S&P on January 14, 1999 on the financial markets of Argentina, Russia, Mexico 
and South Africa. 
Argentina
96
98
100
102
104
106
108
110
12/31/1998
1/14/1999
1/29/1999
Mexico
96
98
100
102
104
106
108
110
12/31/1998
1/14/1999
1/29/1999
Russia
96
98
100
102
104
106
108
110
12/31/1998
1/14/1999
1/29/1999
South Africa
96
98
100
102
104
106
108
110
12/31/1998
1/14/1999
1/29/1999
 
Figure 6:   Country Study: Short-Term Contagious Impact of Brazil’s Credit Rating 
Downgrade on January 14, 1999 
Figure 6 shows that the movements in the speculative market pressure index following 
the downgrade of Brazil’s long-term foreign currency debt seem not to have a significant 
contagious impact on the financial markets of Russia, Mexico and South Africa. Not 
surprisingly, the only exception is Argentina, where the index of speculative market pressure 
rose in the aftermath of the sovereign credit rating event by around five percent, since Brazil 
is Argentina’s main trade partner. 
However, this strong impact on the financial markets in Argentina should not be 
attributed only to S&P’s credit rating action on Brazil in mid-January 1999, because 
simultaneously on January 13, 1999 the free-float of the Brazilian currency was announced by 
the central bank authorities. Moreover, during the following two weeks the Brazilian real lost  
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more than 30 percent of its value against the US dollar, leading to general fears of a 
devaluation of the Argentine peso. 
 
V.3  Contemporaneous Contagious Effects of Sovereign Credit Rating 
Actions 
The pooled panel equations (4) to (6) are estimated via OLS with robust standard errors, using 
the White correction for heteroscedasticity. Table 4 presents the panel regression results for 
specification I, i.e., the contemporaneous impact of sovereign credit rating actions in the 
ground-zero country j on the speculative market pressure indexes of the other 27 emerging 
market economies employed in this empirical analysis, with the respective t-statistics and 
significance levels. 
Table 4:   Panel Regression Results Specification I 
Variable Specification  I 
Constant 0.000   
(− 0.667) 
Lagged SMP 0.105
***  
(5.122) 
Domestic Rating  − 0.017
***  
(− 2.442) 
Foreign Rating  − 0.007
**  
(− 2.087) 
US Interest Rate  0.035
***  
(2.949) 
R
2  0.013 
 
The pooled panel regression results in Table 4 show that the coefficient for the lagged 
dependent variable is, as expected, positive and statistically highly significant.
8 The 
coefficient for changes in domestic sovereign credit ratings is, also as hypothesized from 
theoretical reflections, negative and statistically highly significant at the one percent level, 
                                                 
8   PESARAN AND SMITH (1995) mention that the size of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in a 
dynamic fixed-effect model might be biased. Nonetheless, the focus lies here on the significance and size of 
the exogenous variables, i.e., the size of the long-run effects is not of primary interest. Moreover, if the fixed-
effect homogeneity restrictions were dropped, the consequence would be a considerable loss of degrees of 
freedom.  
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although at 1.7 percent it is less than the average daily change in the speculative market 
pressure index of 1.8 percent (see Table 1). 
The coefficient for the foreign sovereign credit rating of the ground-zero country is as 
expected from theoretical considerations also negative and statistically significant at the five 
percent level. However, the empirical results suggest that the overall contemporaneous 
contagious impact of a sovereign credit rating action in country j is less than one percent on 
the financial markets of the other emerging market economies. These results indicate that 
changes in sovereign risk assessments have substantially stronger rating effects on the country 
being assessed by the credit rating agencies than on other countries. The coefficient of the US 
short-term interest rate has the right sign in specification I and is statistically highly 
significant at the one percent level. 
The next specification II examines the hypothesis that the potential contagious impact 
of sovereign credit ratings is stronger within the same geographical region than across 
different areas. Therefore, four separate geographical regions, specifically Asia, Latin 
America, Eastern Europe and Africa/Middle East
9 are distinguished, and the pooled panel 
equation (5) is estimated via OLS. Table 5 presents the regression results with the respective 
t-statistics and significance levels. 
Table 5:   Panel Regression Results Specification II 
Variable Specification  II 
Constant 0.000   
(− 1.036) 
Lagged SMP  0.105
***  
(5.210) 
Domestic Rating  − 0.018
***  
(− 2.467) 
FR Rating  − 0.012
**  
(− 2.115) 
FNR Rating  − 0.005
*  
(− 1.739) 
US Interest Rate  0.034
***  
(2.880) 
R
2 0.013 
 
                                                 
9   Turkey is included for the pooled panel estimation of specification IV in the African and Middle East sub-
sample.  
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Table 5 displays that the estimated coefficients for the lagged dependent variable, the 
domestic sovereign credit rating and for the US short-term interest rate have the expected 
signs and are statistically highly significant at the one percent level. 
The pooled panel regression results in Table  5 provide also evidence on a widely 
discussed issue in the contagion literature: whether financial contagion is regional or global. 
As expected from theoretical considerations and other empirical studies on financial 
contagion (see, for example, KAMINSKY AND SCHMUKLER (2002)), the empirical results 
indicate that the regional contagious impact (FR Rating) from sovereign credit rating actions 
seem to be stronger on the financial markets in emerging market economies than the 
contagious rating impact from other regions (FNR Rating).  
Table 5 points out that the sovereign credit rating announcements within the region of 
country i lead to average increases of the speculative market pressure index of 1.2 percent 
while the contagious impact of sovereign credit rating changes from emerging market 
economies outside the region of country i result only in about half the contagious rating 
effect. Both coefficients are statistically significant but as can be seen from Table  1, the 
contagious rating effects of the sovereign credit rating changes in country j on country i are at 
1.2 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively, even less than the daily average changes in the index 
of speculative market pressure of 1.8 percent. 
Finally, specification III investigates whether interest rate changes in financial centers 
have a stronger market impact on vulnerable emerging market economies. As a consequence, 
specification III examines whether changes of the US short-term interest rate might have a 
stronger effect on vulnerable emerging market countries. For that reason, the sample of 28 
emerging markets is divided into two sub-samples according to the sovereign credit ratings 
assigned by S&P and Moody’s. In particular, the observations are divided into two equal 
parts: sub-sample I consists of emerging market economies with investment-grade (IG) 
sovereign credit ratings and sub-sample II contains the governments with speculative-grade 
ratings.
10 Table 6 presents the OLS regression results for the pooled panel equation (6) with 
the respective t-statistics and significance levels.  
                                                 
10    The first sub-sample which contains investment-grade sovereign credit ratings consists of 14 countries, 
namely, South Africa, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong SAR, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, China, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Taiwan, while the second sub-sample consists of 
the remaining 14 speculative-grade sovereigns, namely, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, 
Venezuela, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Morocco, Russia and the Slovak Republic.  
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Table 6:   Panel Regression Results Specification III 
Variable Specification  III 
Constant 0.000   
(− 1.075) 
Lagged SMP 0.105
***  
(5.215) 
Domestic Rating  − 0.018
***  
(− 2.479) 
FR Rating  − 0.012
**  
(− 2.187) 
FNR Rating  − 0.005
*  
(− 1.815) 
US Interest Rate (IG)  0.026  
(1.244) 
US Interest Rate (SG)  0.042
***  
(2.487) 
R
2  0.015 
 
As expected from theoretical considerations, the estimation results in Table  6 
demonstrate that speculative-grade rated sovereigns are more affected by changes in 
international interest rates, as measured by the US short-term interest rate, than by the 
agencies’ investment-grade rated emerging market economies. The empirical results indicate 
that fluctuations in US short-term interest rates have with 4.2 percent versus 2.6 percent more 
than a 50 percent greater market impact on more vulnerable emerging market economies 
(those with speculative-grade sovereign credit ratings) than on less vulnerable emerging 
market economies (those with investment-grade sovereign credit ratings). Interestingly, 
emerging market economies with investment-grade credit risk assessments are not affected in 
a statistically significant way by changes in US short-term interest rates, while the coefficient 
for emerging market economies with non-investment-grade sovereign credit ratings is 
statistically highly significant at the one percent level. 
It is central to keep in mind that all of the above specified and via OLS estimated 
pooled panel regressions implicitly assume that there is a zero correlation between the error 
term and the explanatory variables (see equations (4) to (6). However, such a correlation can 
come to pass if an explanatory variable is endogenously determined. That does not mean that 
the credit rating agencies’ sovereign risk adjustments or changes in the US short-term interest 
rate would respond (immediately) to contemporaneous daily movements in the speculative  
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market pressure index, i.e., to movements in the nominal exchange rate, the overnight interest 
rate and/or stock market prices of the emerging market economies. 
Nevertheless, a correlation between the one period lagged dependent variable  1 it SMP − ∆  
and the error term  it ε  is possible. For instance, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) mention that such 
a correlation can indeed arise when the true underlying model was in levels and then first 
differenced. In that case, the error term in the specified pooled panel regressions would be in 
first differences and correlated by construction with the lagged endogenous variable. To 
correct for potential biased coefficients, equation (6), i.e., specification III is estimated via 
two-stage least squares by employing as instruments the fourth lag of the dependent 
variable 1 it SMP − ∆ . Table 7 presents the 2SLS estimation results with the respective t-statistics 
and significance levels. 
Table 7:   2SLS Panel Regression Results Specification III 
Variable Specification  III 
Constant 0.000   
(− 1.092) 
Lagged SMP  − 0.521  
(− 1.156) 
Domestic Rating  − 0.021
***  
(− 3.132) 
FR Rating  − 0.016
***  
(− 2.570) 
FNR Rating  − 0.008
*  
(− 1.765) 
US Interest Rate (IG)  0.025
*  
(1.713) 
US Interest Rate (SG)  0.041
***  
(2.445) 
R
2  0.014 
 
The statistics of Table 7 indicate that the empirical results of the specified pooled panel 
regressions are robust when controlling for potentially biased coefficients by using 2SLS 
estimation.  
Overall, as all the above pooled panel regression estimations indicate, sovereign credit 
rating changes in the ground-zero country have a contagious impact on the financial markets  
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of other emerging market economies, as measured by the significant coefficients of the index 
of speculative market pressure. Nevertheless, this contagious rating effect is smaller than the 
rating effect of the sovereign credit rating announcements in the domestic country. Matching 
the findings by GLICK AND ROSE (1999), KAMINSKY AND REINHART (2002) and KAMINSKY 
AND SCHMUKLER (2002), these contagious rating effects tend to be regional, which means that 
the impact of domestic sovereign credit rating changes tends to be limited to the neighboring 
countries. Furthermore, the empirical results seem to suggest that lower-rated sovereigns are 
more vulnerable to changes in international interest rates as measured by movements in US 
short-term interest rates. 
To check for robustness of the event studies and panel regression results, a number of 
alternative specifications based on S&P’s and Moody’s sovereign credit ratings have been 
applied, but none substantially improved the fit. In particular, the sovereign risk assessments 
from only one credit rating agency at a time were included or the higher or the lower 
sovereign credit rating for each country has been selected. A kinked function with a structural 
break instead of the linear transformation has been also considered.
11 Another alternative 
transformation of the sovereign credit rating symbols by S&P and Moody’s is the logistic 
transformation which contains the hypothesis that risk perceptions first deteriorate slowly as 
rating-notches decrease, then deteriorate faster when sovereign credit ratings fall from 
investment-grade to speculative-grade, and finally deteriorate slowly again as sovereign risk 
assessments reach the bottom of the agencies’ sovereign credit rating classification. However, 
both transformations did not change the empirical results of the event studies and panel 
regressions significantly. 
In addition, several assumptions on which the event study is built are tested. 
Econometric tests applying the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the partial autocorrelation 
function (PACF) prove that the time series are not autocorrelated. The augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test rejected the hypothesis that the time series are integrated of the order one or 
higher. The Jarque-Bera (JB) test could not reject the hypothesis that the time series follow a 
normal distribution in the sample or in any of the sub-samples. Furthermore, in the sample 
and all the sub-samples more than 75 percent of the sovereign credit rating actions have the 
right sign: the speculative market pressure index increases with a negative sovereign credit 
                                                 
11  This transformation allows fully capturing the impact when the sovereign passes from investment-grade to 
non-investment-grade by allowing for a numerical change of three rating-notches instead of only one (see 
Table A1 in the Appendix). Additionally, the imminent sovereign credit rating actions between investment-
grade and speculative-grade are also considered with a more heavy weight by adding + (− ) one rating-notch 
for a positive (negative) credit watch, and by adding + (− ) half a rating-notch for a positive (negative) rating 
outlook to the implemented sovereign credit rating.  
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rating action but decreases with a positive sovereign credit rating announcement by the credit 
rating agencies. 
 
VI Conclusion  and  Outlook 
The recent worldwide financial market instability has been the major focus of attention in 
both academic studies and the media. With the financial market crashes in Argentina and 
Turkey in 2001-02, this interest in financial market crises is not going to diminish in the 
foreseeable future. Numerous observers have made the case that international capital market 
globalization and integration is at the center of financial market instability, with highly diver-
sified institutional investors showing little attention to emerging markets’ economic 
fundamentals and instead following the herd of market participants in the presence of 
asymmetric information in financial markets. 
Sovereign credit rating adjustments may also convey substantial new information about 
an individual country’s creditworthiness. Credit rating changes for long-term foreign currency 
debt may act as a wake-up call with upgrades and downgrades in one country affecting other 
financial markets within and across national borders. Such a potential (contagious) rating 
effect is likely to be stronger in emerging market economies, where institutional investors’ 
problems of asymmetric information are more present. Therefore, this empirical study has 
analyzed the role of credit rating agencies in international financial markets. In particular, the 
specific impact of sovereign credit rating changes during the financial turmoil in emerging 
markets in the latter half of the 1990s has been examined. The data set is not only expanded to 
update previous studies but also to test new hypotheses about the implications of sovereign 
credit rating changes on financial markets in emerging economies. This study complements 
earlier research by explicitly examining cross-security and cross-country contagious rating 
effects of credit rating agencies’ sovereign risk assessments.  
The results of the empirical study show that sovereign credit rating changes in a 
ground-zero country have a significant impact on the financial markets of other emerging 
market economies. However, this contagious rating effect is smaller than that of the sovereign 
credit rating announcements in the domestic country. Further, the spillover effects tend to be 
regional, which means that contagious rating effects tend to be limited to neighboring 
countries. Another substantial result of the empirical analysis is that speculative-grade rated 
emerging market economies are more vulnerable to interest rate changes in financial centers. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1:  S&P’s and Moody’s Emerging Market Sovereign Credit Rating History  
(January 1997 to December 2000) 
IMF Country  Date  S&P Moody’s 
186  Turkey  01/01/1997  B (N)  Ba3 (N) 
   01/09/1997    Ba3 (CW− ) 
   03/13/1997    B1  (N) 
   08/10/1998  B  (O+)   
   01/21/1999  B  (N)   
   11/30/1999    B1  (O+) 
   12/10/1999  B  (O+)   
   04/25/2000  B+  (O+)   
   07/24/2000    B1  (CW+) 
   12/05/2000  B+  (N)   
   12/22/2000    B1  (N) 
199  South Africa  01/01/1997  BB+ (O+)  Baa3 (N) 
   03/06/1998  BB+  (N)   
   07/17/1998    Baa3 (CW− ) 
   10/02/1998    Baa3  (N) 
   02/07/2000    Baa3  (O+) 
   02/25/2000  BBB−  (N)   
213 Argentina  01/01/1997  BB−  (N)  B1 (N) 
   04/02/1997  BB  (N)   
   10/02/1997    Ba3  (N) 
   09/03/1998    Ba3 (CW− ) 
   02/10/1999    Ba3 (O− ) 
   07/22/1999  BB (O− )   
   08/20/1999    Ba3 (CW− ) 
   10/06/1999    B1  (N) 
   02/10/2000  BB  (N)   
   10/31/2000  BB (CW− )   
   11/14/2000  BB−  (N)   
   11/21/2000    B1 (O− ) 
223  Brazil  01/01/1997  B+ (O+)  B1 (N) 
   04/02/1997  BB−  (N)   
   06/08/1998    B1 (O− ) 
   09/03/1998    B2  (N) 
   09/10/1998  BB−  (O− )   
   01/14/1999  B+ (O− )   
   11/09/1999  B+  (N)   
   02/29/2000  B+  (O+)   
   08/17/2000    B2  (CW+)  
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223 Brazil  10/16/2000    B1  (CW+) 
228 Chile  01/01/1997  A−  (N)  Baa1 (N) 
233 Colombia  01/01/1997  BBB−  (O+)  Baa3 (N) 
   10/07/1997  BBB−  (N)   
   05/21/1998    Baa3 (O− ) 
   09/30/1998    Baa3 (CW− ) 
   12/18/1998    Baa3 (O− ) 
   06/09/1999    Baa3 (CW− ) 
   06/11/1999  BBB−  (O− )   
   08/11/1999    Ba2  (N) 
   09/21/1999  BB+  (N)   
   04/10/2000  BB+ (O− )   
   05/23/2000  BB (O− )   
248  Ecuador  01/01/1997  n. r.  n. r. 
   07/24/1997    B1  (N) 
   04/17/1998    B1 (O− ) 
   06/08/1998    B1 (CW− ) 
   09/14/1998    B3  (N) 
   10/05/1999    Caa2  (N) 
   07/29/2000  SD   
   08/28/2000  B−  (N)   
273 Mexico  01/01/1997  BB  (N)  Ba2  (N) 
   09/02/1997  BB  (O+)   
   09/03/1998    Ba2 (CW− ) 
   10/02/1998  BB  (N)   
   02/10/1999    Ba2 (O− ) 
   06/09/1999    Ba2  (N) 
   06/21/1999    Ba2  (CW+) 
   08/10/1999    Ba1  (O+) 
   09/02/1999  BB  (O+)   
   02/02/2000    Ba1  (CW+) 
   03/07/2000    Baa3  (N) 
   03/10/2000  BB+  (O+)   
293  Peru  01/01/1997  n. r.  B2 (N) 
   12/18/1997  BB  (N)   
   01/13/1998    B2  (O+) 
   02/13/1998    B2  (CW+) 
   03/27/1998    Ba3  (N) 
   05/19/2000  BB (CW− )   
   06/15/2000  BB  (N)   
   10/31/2000  BB−  (N)   
   12/12/2000    Ba3 (O− ) 
299  Venezuela  01/01/1997  B (O+)  Ba2 (N) 
   06/05/1997  B+  (N)   
   02/12/1998    Ba2 (O− ) 
   05/08/1998    Ba2 (CW− ) 
   07/22/1998    B1  (N)  
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299 Venezuela  08/31/1998  B+ (O− )   
   09/03/1998    B2  (N) 
   12/21/1999  B  (N)   
469  Egypt  01/01/1997  n. r.  Ba2 (N) 
   01/15/1997  BBB−  (N)   
   08/12/1997    Ba2  (O+) 
   10/01/1997    Ba2  (CW+) 
   11/14/1997    Ba1  (N) 
   07/03/2000  BBB−  (O− )   
532  Hong Kong SAR  01/01/1997  A (O+)  A3 (N) 
   05/14/1997  A+  (N)   
   02/18/1998    A3 (O− ) 
   06/22/1998  A+ (CW− )   
   08/31/1998  A (O− )   
   09/03/1998    A3 (CW− ) 
   05/24/1999    A3  (N) 
   12/07/1999  A  (N)   
534 India  01/01/1997  BB+  (O+)  Baa3  (N) 
   10/06/1997  BB+  (N)   
   01/08/1998    Baa3 (CW− ) 
   05/22/1998  BB+ (O− )   
   06/19/1998    Ba2  (N) 
   10/22/1998  BB  (N)   
   10/06/1999    Ba2  (O+) 
   03/20/2000  BB  (O+)   
   10/10/2000  BB  (N)   
536 Indonesia  01/01/1997  BBB  (N) Baa3  (N) 
   10/10/1997  BBB−  (N)   
   10/27/1997    Baa3 (O− ) 
   12/22/1997    Ba1  (N) 
   12/31/1997  BB+ (O− )   
   01/09/1998  BB (CW− )   
   01/27/1998  B (CW− )   
   03/11/1998  B−  (CW− )   
   03/20/1998    B3  (N) 
   05/15/1998  CCC+ (CW− )   
   07/08/1998  CCC+ (O− )   
   03/30/1999  SD   
   03/31/1999  CCC+  (N)   
   09/13/1999  CCC+ (CW− )   
   12/15/1999    B3  (O+) 
   04/17/2000  SD   
   10/02/2000  B−  (N)   
542 South  Korea 01/01/1997  AA−  (N)  A1 (N) 
   08/05/1997    A1 (O− ) 
   08/06/1997  AA−  (O− )   
   10/24/1997  A+ (O− )    
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542 South  Korea 11/25/1997  A−  (CW− )   
   11/27/1997    A3  (N) 
   12/10/1997    Baa2 (CW− ) 
   12/11/1997  BBB−  (CW− )   
   12/22/1997  B+ (CW− )  Ba1 (N) 
   01/09/1998    Ba1 (CW− ) 
   02/18/1998  BB+  (N)   
   03/30/1998    Ba1  (N) 
   12/18/1998    Ba1  (CW+) 
   01/04/1999  BB+  (O+)   
   01/25/1999  BBB−  (O+)   
   02/12/1999    Baa3  (O+) 
   08/23/1999    Baa3  (CW+) 
   11/11/1999  BBB  (O+)   
   12/16/1999    Baa2  (N) 
548  Malaysia  01/01/1997  A+ (O+)  A1 (N) 
   08/18/1997  A+  (N)   
   09/25/1997  A+ (O− )   
   12/22/1997    A2  (N) 
   12/23/1997  A (O− )   
   02/05/1998    A2 (O− ) 
   04/17/1998  A−  (N)   
   06/04/1998    A2 (CW− ) 
   07/23/1998    Baa2  (N) 
   07/24/1998  BBB+ (O− )   
   09/14/1998    Baa3 (CW− ) 
   09/15/1998  BBB−  (O− )   
   12/01/1998    Baa3 (O− ) 
   03/31/1999  BBB−  (N)   
   04/20/1999    Baa3  (N) 
   06/10/1999    Baa3  (O+) 
   11/11/1999  BBB  (N)   
   07/12/2000    Baa3  (CW+) 
   09/01/2000  BBB  (O+)   
   10/17/2000    Baa2  (N) 
564  Pakistan  01/01/1997  B+ (N)  B2 (N) 
   01/14/1998  B+ (O− )   
   05/22/1998  B+ (CW− )   
   05/28/1998    B3  (N) 
   06/01/1998  B−  (CW− )   
   07/14/1998  CCC (CW− )   
   10/12/1998  CCC−  (O− )   
   10/23/1998    Caa1  (N) 
   12/03/1998  CC (O− )   
   01/29/1999  SD   
   12/21/1999  B−  (N)   
566 The  Philippines  01/01/1997  BB−  (O+)  Ba2 (N) 
   01/23/1997    Ba2  (CW+)  
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566  The Philippines  02/21/1997  BB+ (O+)   
   05/19/1997    Ba1  (N) 
   09/25/1997  BB+  (N)   
   02/23/1998  BB+ (O− )   
   01/06/1999  BB+  (N)   
   10/19/2000  BB+ (O− )   
   10/27/2000    Ba1 (O− ) 
576  Singapore  01/01/1997  AAA (N)  Aa1 (N) 
578  Thailand  01/01/1997  A (N)  A2 (N) 
   02/13/1997    A2 (CW− ) 
   04/08/1997    A3  (N) 
   07/24/1997    A3  (O+) 
   08/01/1997  A (CW− )   
   09/03/1997  A−  (O− )   
   09/09/1997    A3 (CW− ) 
   10/01/1997    Baa1 (O− ) 
   10/24/1997  BBB (O− )   
   11/27/1997    Baa3 (O− ) 
   12/22/1997    Ba1  (N) 
   01/08/1998  BBB−  (O− )   
   05/03/1999    Ba1  (O+) 
   05/05/1999  BBB−  (N)   
   04/03/2000    Ba1  (CW+) 
   06/22/2000    Baa3  (N) 
686  Morocco  01/01/1997  n. r.  n. r. 
   03/02/1998  BB  (N)  Ba1  (N) 
922 Russia  01/01/1997  BB−  (N)  Ba2 (N) 
   12/19/1997  BB−  (O− )   
   02/03/1998    Ba2 (CW− ) 
   03/11/1998    Ba3  (N) 
   05/27/1998  BB−  (CW− )   
   05/29/1998    B1  (N) 
   06/09/1998  B+  (N)   
   08/13/1998  B−  (O− )  B2 (N) 
   08/17/1998  CCC (O− )   
   08/21/1998    B3  (N) 
   09/16/1998  CCC−  (O− )   
   01/27/1999  SD   
   04/10/2000    B3  (O+) 
   08/23/2000    B3  (CW+) 
   11/13/2000    B2  (N) 
   12/08/2000  B−  (N)   
924  China  01/01/1997  BBB (O+)  A3 (N) 
   05/14/1997  BBB+  (N)   
   02/19/1998    A3 (O− ) 
   07/16/1998  BBB+ (O− )   
   09/03/1998    A3 (CW− )  
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924 China  12/03/1998    A3  (N) 
   07/21/1999  BBB  (N)   
935  Czech Rep.  01/01/1997  A (N)  Baa1 (N) 
   11/05/1998  A−  (N)   
936 Slovak  Rep. 01/01/1997  BBB−  (N)  Baa3 (N) 
   11/03/1997    Baa3 (O− ) 
   01/20/1998    Baa3 (CW− ) 
   03/30/1998    Ba1  (N) 
   04/07/1998  BBB−  (O− )   
   09/17/1998  BB+ (O− )   
   10/01/1998    Ba1 (CW− ) 
   02/18/1999    Ba1 (O− ) 
   10/27/1999    Ba1  (N) 
   11/12/1999  BB+  (N)   
   11/07/2000    Ba1  (O+) 
   11/09/2000  BB+  (O+)   
944 Hungary  01/01/1997  BBB−  (N)  Baa3 (N) 
   11/05/1997    Baa3  (O+) 
   01/22/1998  BBB−  (O+)   
   03/20/1998    Baa3  (CW+) 
   05/08/1998    Baa2  (O+) 
   12/11/1998  BBB  (O+)   
   06/25/1999    Baa1  (N) 
   02/02/2000  BBB+  (O+)   
   04/10/2000    Baa1  (O+) 
   09/13/2000    Baa1  (CW+) 
   11/14/2000    A3  (N) 
   12/19/2000  A−  (N)   
964 Poland  01/01/1997  BBB−  (N)  Baa3 (N) 
   06/03/1997  BBB−  (O+)   
   12/03/1998    Baa3  (O+) 
   06/10/1999  BBB  (O+)   
   09/02/1999    Baa1  (N) 
   05/15/2000  BBB+  (N)   
9998  Taiwan  01/01/1997  AA+ (N)  Aa3 (N) 
   12/06/2000  AA+ (O− )   
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Table A2:  Linear Transformation of Sovereign Credit Rating Scales 
S&P  Moody’s  Linear Scale  Structural Break 
AAA Aaa  20  22 
AA+ Aa1  19  21 
AA Aa2  18  20 
AA−   Aa3 17  19 
A+ A1 16  18 
A A2 15 17 
A−   A3 14 16 
BBB+ Baa1  13  15 
BBB Baa2  12  14 
BBB−   Baa3 11  13 
BB+ Ba1  10  10 
BB Ba2  9  9 
BB−   Ba3 8  8 
B+ B1  7  7 
B B2 6  6 
B−   B3 5  5 
CCC+ Caa1  4  4 
CCC Caa2  3  3 
CCC−   Caa3 2  2 
CC Ca  1  1 
SD C  0  0 
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